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A critical impediment to transnational collection of taxes is an old
common law rule: the courts of one nation will not enforce the tax laws
of another.' When first articulated over two hundred years ago,2 the
rule was rational. Countries were engaged in great commercial rival-
ries and did not wish to assist their international competitors in the
collection of revenues.
The rule is an unacceptable burden on the modem community of
nations.3 International tax evasion now threatens the integrity of every
national taxing system.4 Judicial reluctance to assist transnational tax
collection has become a legal anomaly; international cooperation in
other areas of the law (such as enforcement of private law judgments5
and extradition of accused criminals 6) is now more the rule than the
exception. Despite the many writers who have criticized the rule's ef-
fects7 and who have made alternative proposals" there has been no ju-
dicial or legislative movement to abandon the established practice of
non-enforcement of foreign tax judgments.9
t J.D. Yale Law School, 1982.
1. See, e.g., Government of India v. Taylor, 1955 A.C. 503, [1955] 1 All E.R. 292 (former
English corporation nationalized by Indian government; Indian tax on capital gain not en-
forced in English court). See Note, InternationalEnforcement of Tax Claims, 50 COLUM. L.
REv. 490 (1950) for a thorough critique of the common law rule.
2. The rule can be traced to two English cases decided in 1775. Holman v. Johnson, 1
Cowp. 341,343, 98 Eng. Rep. 1120, 1121 (K.B. 1775); Planche v. Fletcher, 1 Doug. 251, 253,
99 Eng. Rep. 164, 165 (K.B. 1775).
3. See, e.g., Note, International Enforcement of Tax Claims, 50 COLUM. L. RV. 490
(1950).
4. Surr, INTERTAX: Intergovernmental Cooperation in Taxation, 7 HARV. INT'L L.
CLUB J. 179, 179-81 (1966).
5. See 47 AM. JUR. 2D Judgments § 1215 (1969) (recognition under comity-judgments
of foreign nations).
6. See generally I. SHEARER, EXTRADITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1971); 31 AM. JJR.
2D Extradition §§ 7-13 (1967).
7. See Johnson, Recoprocal Enforcement of Tax Claims Through Tax Treaties, 33 TAx
LAWYER 469 (1980) ("A foreign government has never attempted to enforce a tax claim in
United States courts.") See also Robertson, Extraterritorial Enforcement of Tax Obligations,
7 ARIz. L. Rnv. 219, 234 n.66 (1966) (no cases upholding enforcement of foreign tax judg-
ments have arisen in federal court).
8. See Johnson, supra note 7, at 470.
9. See id.
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This comment argues that the common law rule of non-enforcement
of tax judgments is not desirable, and that published alternative pro-
posals are fundamentally flawed because they apply a formal concept
of reciprocity. This comment proposes a refined concept of reciproc-
ity-"structural reflection"- and an accompanying series of tests that
will resolve the shortcomings of previous proposals. This concept mini-
mizes the undesirable effects of formal reciprocity and presents a more
satisfactory legal approach to transnational tax enforcement.
Discussion will be confined to the enforcement of taxjudgments, that
is, final decrees issued after the completion of formal legal proceedings.
Tax judgments must be distinguished from tax claims, which are the
assessments claimed by a taxing authority, but not subjected to contest
and proof.'0 The terms "judgment state" and "enforcing state" will be
used throughout. The judgment state is the state which imposes the tax
and which has obtained a tax judgment through its own courts. The
enforcing state is the state where the taxpayer or his assets can be found
and which is asked to give effect to the tax judgment.
The Common Law Rule
The common law rule that the courts of one nation will not enforce
the tax laws of another nation arose during the mid-eighteenth century,
a period of intense commercial rivalries among nations. -The origins
of the rule have been traced to a famous dictum by Lord Mansfield that
"no country ever takes notice of the revenue laws of another."1 2 The
rule itself was announced a few years later in Planche v. Fletcher.1
3
Although these early rulings involved export restrictions, the term "rev-
enue laws" came to encompass the various tax statutes of other
nations. 14
The British House of Lords firmly established the rule's applicability
to modem income taxes in the case of Government of India v. Taylor.1
5
In Taylor, India (judgment state) attempted to compel Britain (enforc-
ing state) to enforce a capital gains tax against a company that had
10. See Note, supra note 3, at 496-98. If nations were to afford legal process to tax
claims it would place upon courts the difficult task of trying foreign tax cases. The day may
come when nations will wish to undertake such obligations, but that date must surely follow
experience with enforcement of tax judgments obtained in the taxing nation's courts.
11. See E. WEBER, A MODERN HisToRY OF EUROPE 450-59 (1971).
12. Holman v. Johnson, 1 Cowp. 341, 343, 98 Eng. Rep. 1120, 1121 (K.B. 1775).
13. 1 Doug. 251, 253, 99 Eng. Rep. 164, 165 (K.B. 1779).
14. See, e.g., Municipal Council of Sidney v. Bull, [1909] 1 K.B. 7; In re Visser, [1928] 1
Ch. 877.
15. 1955 A.C. 503, [1955] 1 All E. R. 292.
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previously operated in India. The tax was based on gains recognized
when the company's assets were nationalized by the Indian govern-
ment.16 The House of Lords held that the Indian government could
not use an English court to enforce such a tax liability.
17
The severity of the common law rule is exemplified by a Supreme
Court of Canada case, United States v. Harden. 8 In Harden, the
United States had obtained a judgment in federal court against Mrs.
Harden for $640,000, representing taxes due and interest. To escape
this judgment, Mrs. Harden moved to Canada, taking with her all her
assets.19 The Canadian supreme court cited the line of common law
authority in refusing to enforce the American judgment.
20
In the United States, the common law rule was at one time generally
adopted among the individual states, each refusing to enforce tax judg-
ments of sister states. 21 The United States Supreme Court declared this
practice unconstitutional in Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co. ,22
holding that "full faith and credit" requires recognition of tax judg-
ments on the same basis as private law judgments.23 The Supreme
Court did not decide whether "full faith and credit" also required the
prosecution of a sister state's tax claims,24 but some state courts have
independently permitted actions on tax assessments imposed by other
states.25
In the international field, however, an American court would proba-
bly follow the common law rule and refuse to enforce a foreign tax
judgment in the absence of a treaty obligation.26 While there are no
16. Id. at 503, 1 All E. R. at 292.
17. Id.
18. 41 D.L.R. 2d 721, 63-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9768 (1963).
19. Id. at 721-23, 63-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9768.
20. Id. at 724-27, 63-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9768. For a critical discussion of the
opinion see Recent Cases, 77 HARv. L. REv. 1327 (1964).
21. See Robertson, ExtraterritorialEnforcement of Tax Obligations, 7 Amiz. L. REv. 219,
225-34 (1966).
22. 296 U.S. 268 (1935).
23. Id. at 279.
24. Id.
25. See, e.g., Ohio v. Arnett, 314 Ky. 403, 234 S.W.2d 722 (1950) (Kentucky court al-
lowed action by Ohio for collection of workmen's compensation premiums); State v. Rod-
gers, 197 Mo. App. 217, 193 S.W.2d 919 (1946) (Missouri court allowed action by Oklahoma
for collection of taxes incurred when defendants resided in Oklahoma).
The gradual waning of the common law rule, at least in the sister state context, is indi-
cated by the American Law Institute, which, after incorporating the common law rule in its
1934 Restatement of Conflicts, deleted the rule from the 1969 Restatement Second. RE-
STATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 443 (1934) provided that "[a] valid foreign judgment
for the payment of money, which has been obtained in favor of a state, a state agency, or a
private person, on a cause of action created by the law of the foreign state as a method of
furthering its own governmental interests will not be enforced." Id.
26. See Robertson, supra note 21, at 234.
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court decisions based on a foreign government's attempt to enforce its
tax judgment in an American court,27 support for the common law rule
can be inferred from judicial pronouncements in related areas. New
York courts, for example, have frequently applied the rule in cases in-
volving exchange control restrictions of a foreign nation,28 and foreign
death taxes.
29
The common law rule has been criticized on several grounds. It has
been said to represent a "gap" in the international legal enforcement
scheme. 30 Criminal laws are given extraterritorial reach by means of
bilateral extradition agreements. 3' Foreign private law judgments are
customarily enforced pursuant to the comity principle.
32
Other critics point to the seriousness of international tax evasion.
3 3
Every taxing body is vulnerable to loss of tax revenues if taxpayers can
simply remove themselves from the taxing jurisdiction and thereby
avoid payment of taxes.34 As governments attempt to tax more private
wealth, international cooperation is necessary to ensure the effective
collection of taxes. The common law rule fosters a jungle environment
where every country is expected to "go it alone" in tax collection. Crit-
ics point out that greater total revenues could be realized through inter-
national cooperation in the enforcement of tax judgments.
35
27. See Robertson, supra note 21.
28. Banco do Brasil v. Israel Co., 12 N.Y.2d 371, 239 N.Y.S.2d 872, 190 N.E.2d 235
(1963).
29. See, e.g., In re Matthew's Trust, 21 Misc. 2d 356, 358, 191 N.Y.S.2d 994, 996 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1959) where a New York court states that "... the courts of this state will not
enforce the revenue laws nor aid in the collection of taxes of another state or nation, absent
reciprocal agreements." Id. See also In re Bliss' Trust, 26 Misc. 2d 969, 208 N.Y.S.2d 725
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1960); Estate of Robinson, 25 Misc. 2d 9, 206 N.Y.S.2d 459 (N.Y. Sur. Ct.
1960); Estate of Lamar, 15 Misc. 2d 544, 182 N.Y.S.2d 512 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1958); McNell's
Estate, 10 Misc. 2d 359, 170 N.Y.S.2d 893 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1957).
30. See Leflar, Extrastate Enforcement of Penal Claims and Governmental Claims, 96
HARV. L. RE. 193 (1932). Leflar asserts that
[t]he intervention of state boundary lines enables such persons to avoid their liabilities
altogether. They take advantage of a little area of incomplete development in the law,
carelessly left lying in between two large areas whose development has been along dif-
ferent lines. On the one side lies the great body of law enforcing civil liabilities as
such. . .. On the other side the criminal law seeks to exert itself by the device of
extradition and interstate rendition. The neglected middle ground was at one time un-
important, an area within which there arose little litigation. That is no longer true.
Attempts to evade taxation alone have become so important within this area that some
equivalent device for protection against them is becoming a practical necessity.
Id. at 220.
3 1. See supra note 6.
32. See supra note 5.
33. "International tax evasion... [is] a recognized evil from both a moral and eco-
nomic viewpoint... ." Note, supra note 3, at 490.
34. See Surr, supra note 4, at 179-82.
35. Id. at 182-84.
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Perhaps the most appealing argument against the common law rule
is that it promotes the evil known as "tax immorality. '36 Taxes have
become commonplace in the modem world, and are, in the words of
Justice Holmes, "what we pay for civilized society." 37 Governments
are constrained in the amount of wealth they can subject to tax.
Wealth or income which escapes taxation often cannot be made up,
except at the cost of increasing levels of hardship for other taxpayers.
38
These "honest" taxpayers, who do not take advantage of the common
law rule, consequently bear a greater share in supporting the state.39
The effect of legal evasion through the common law rule is loss of reve-
nue, loss of tax-producing capital, and increased taxation of the unfor-
tunates who are within the reach of the taxing authorities and who
compose the tax base.
40
The Limitations of Unilateral Enforcement
International non-cooperation in the enforcement and collection of
tax judgments effectively limits national taxing power to the unilateral
situations where the taxing state has access to (1) a person, (2) an in-
come-generating item of wealth, or (3) some other asset or item of
wealth. These three classes of tax "reach" are analogous to the tradi-
tional jurisdictional categories: in personam,41 in rem, 42 and quasi in
36. Leflar, supra note 30, at 216. "[Tjhere is currently developing public morality which
considers the obligation to pay taxes validly imposed to be as binding as the obligation to
pay a private debt voluntarily undertaken." Id.
37. Compania General de Tabacos v. Collector, 275 U.S. 87, 100 (1927) (Holmes, J.
dissenting).
38. See Surr, supra note 4, at 180.
39. Leflar, supra note 30, at 216. Leflar asserts that "[t]he tax burden is a tolerable thing
only as it is fairly distributed. Complete evasion by some inevitably increases the burdens of
others." Id.
40. See supra note 38.
41. A nation has "in personam" tax reach when it can exact a tax by virtue of its legal
powers over the taxpayer's person, even if the wealth or income on which the tax is deter-
mined is located outside that taxing nation's boundaries. "In personam" tax reach usually
occurs when the taxpayer is physically present within the taxing jurisdiction. For example,
the American taxing authorities can require U.S. resident aliens to pay an income tax based
-on their worldwide income since American courts can reach these taxpayers and their wealth
by proceeding against them personally.
42. A nation has "in rem" tax reach when an income-producing element is present
(physically or constructively) within the taxing jurisdiction, even if its owner is abroad (i.e.,
not subject to personal reach). For example, the United States can tax rental income from
real estate property located within the U.S.-even if owned by a non-resident alien-be-
cause the property itself is within the reach of the U.S. courts.
It could not, however, reach rental income from property situated abroad, unless it could
reach either the owner (in personam) or one of his unrelated assets located within the U.S.
(quasi in rem).
Tax Judgments
rem. 43 The concepts of reach and jurisdiction should not be confused.
Reach must include effective enforcement power while jurisdiction may
be asserted even where it cannot effectively be enforced. 44 Many coun-
tries do not impose taxes on wealth that is likely to be outside of their
tax reach.45 The United States, on the other hand, asserts a taxing ju-
risdiction that far exceeds its reach, i.e. its ability to collect through
unilateral legal means. Indeed, sections 1 and 61 of the Internal Reve-
nue Code46 seem to impose a tax on all persons on their total world-
wide income. 47 Transnational enforcement of tax judgments would
give nations a much longer tax reach. Such a change in international
law might influence changes in the kinds and scopes of taxes nations
impose.
The Grounds for Judgment Recognition
At least two legal bases might justify the enforcement of foreign tax
judgments. The first basis is an explicit obligation found in a treaty.
The second is the independent discretion of a court to apply the "com-
ity" principle.
The use of tax treaties as basic structures for the enforcement of tax
judgments has been extensively discussed in the literature.48 Typically,
Country A agrees to open its courts to Country B for B's use in execut-
ing tax judgments against taxpayers and their assets located in Country
A. Likewise, B's courts would be open to A's use. Tax treaties have
existed for a relatively long time, and several have contained mutual
43. A nation has "quasi in rem" tax reach whenever there is an item of wealth within its
jurisdiction belonging to the taxpayer, even though both the taxpayer and the income-pro-
ducing element on which the tax is based are abroad. Thus, the U.S. may effectively tax a
foreign corporation on its U.S.-source income-even if that income is received or recognized
abroad-if that corporation has other assets located within the United States.
44. I.R.C. §§ 1, 61 (CCH 1981). See infra note 47.
45. For example, the United Kingdom does not seek to tax its nationals when they reside
abroad. See generally WORLD TAX SERIES, TAXATION IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 13/4
(1957).
46. I.R.C. § 1 imposes a tax on the "taxable income of every individual." I.R.C. § 1
(CCH 1981). "Taxable income" in turn is derived from the section 61 definition of gross
income as "all income from whatever source derived." I.R.C. § 61 (CCH 1981). See Mc-
DANIEL & AULT, INTRODUCTION TO UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 36 (1977).
See also OWENS, INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF U.S. INCOME TAXATION § II, 3-4 (1980).
47. The broad tax imposition is circumscribed by other sections of the Code (I.R.C.
§§ 871 and 872 exempt certain foreign individuals from U.S. tax; §§ 881 and 882 exempt
foreign corporations). Case law suggests, however, that should Congress wish to do so, it
could constitutionally impose a universal income tax. Cook v. Tait, 265 U.S. 47, 54 (1924).
See Choate, Hurok & Klein, Federal Tax Policyfor Foreign Income and Foreign Taxpay-
ers-History, Analysis and Prospects, 44 TEMPLE L.Q. 441, 444 (1970-71).
48. See generally Johnson, supra note 7.
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enforcement provisions. 49
Mutual enforcement treaty provisions, in many instances, have criti-
cal weaknesses. First, treaties often have not allowed the judgment
state to proceed against a citizen of the enforcing stateA0 Therefore,
Country A could use the courts of Country B only against those who
are not citizens of Country B. In one writer's assessment, much of the
tax evasion due to the lack of transnational enforcement involves citi-
zens of the enforcing nation returning home with income earned in the
judgment nation.5' Judgments against these taxpayers cannot be en-
forced under the present-day treaty provisions. Second, mutual en-
forcement treaties have been unpopular because governments are
reluctant to subject their residents to legal obligations that may be
unacceptably foreign to their own national legal culture.5 2 For exam-
ple, the United States Congress has shown a consistent hostility to lim-
ited mutual enforcement provisions, based on a concern that
American-style "due process" or "tax equity" may not exist in foreign
tax schemes. 5
3
The problem of enforcing judgments which are offensive to a state
has been solved normally by inserting a "public policy" clause in the
treaties: the courts of the enforcing nation need not enforce judgments
that are against its public policy.54 The public policy clause presents
two major dangers. At one extreme, litigants will argue that the clause
should prevent enforcement, asserting an expansive meaning of
"against the public policy.155 A broad conception of the public policy
exception would preclude enforcement in many cases. At the other ex-
treme, a court which is overly concerned with international goodwill
49. United States treaties include those with Denmark (Convention, Dec. 1, 1948,
United States-Denmark, art. XVIII, 62 Stat. 1730, 1736, T.I.A.S. No. 1354); France (Con-
vention, Aug. 11, 1968, United States-France, art. 27, 19 U.S.T. 5280, 5314-15, T.I.A.S. No.
6518); The Netherlands (Convention, Apr. 29, 1948, United States-Netherlands, art. XXII,
sec. 1, 62 Stat. 1757, 1766, T.I.A.S. No. 1855); and Sweden (Convention, Nov. 14, 1939,
United States-Sweden, art. XVII, 54 Stat. 1759, 1770-71, T.S. 958). For a discussion of the
current operation of enforcement through tax treaties, see Johnson, supra note 7.
50. See Johnson, supra note 7, at 474. United States treaties concluded with France,
Denmark, and the Netherlands do not permit enforcing such judgments. The treaty with
Sweden allows enforcement only against nationals of the judgment state. Id. See also supra
note 50.
51. See Johnson, supra note 7, at 474.
52. See id. at 471.
53. JOINT COMMITTEE ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION, MEMORANDUM, S. EXEC.
REP. No. 5, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 40 (1968), reprinted in 1 TAX TREATIES (CCH) 1 2838, at
2819. See Johnson, supra note 7.
54. See 47 AM. JUR. 2D Judgments § 1245 (1962).
55. "Against public policy" can conceptually be expanded to preclude all foreign




may conclude that use of the public policy clause should be confined.
Whether a judicial forum will accommodate competing considerations
to generate an appropriate level of enforcement is not assured.
The second legal basis for enforcement of foreign tax judgments is
the unilateral, discretionary court application of the comity principle.
This principle already is a common basis for the enforcement of foreign
private law judgments.5 6 Comity parallels the notion of "full faith and
credit" in interstate enforcement. The comity principle is usually pre-
mised on two requirements: reciprocity of enforcement 57 and an ade-
quate degree of compatibility between two legal systems.
5 8
Previous proposals for transnational tax judgment enforcement have
focused on the formal reciprocity aspect of comity, without fully con-
sidering a compatibility analysis. As shown below, formal reciprocity,
while workable in the private judgment field, is not appropriate in the
tax area. The test proposed in this comment, structural reflection, is
based on a refined concept of comity, providing an answer that takes
into account the compatibility aspects of the principle.
Formal Reciprocity
Proposals for transnational enforcement of tax judgments have been
based on some principle of reciprocity.5 9 An analogous requirement
exists for the enforcement of private law judgments.60 Formal reci-
procity means strict mutual enforcement. Country A enforces Country
B's judgments only if Country B enforces those of Country A.
In the tax area, a formal principle of reciprocity that does not allow
for exceptions may be too sweeping to be accepted by the courts. Tax
systems differ. Some countries tax their citizens even when they reside
abroad;61 others do not.62 An English court might be reluctant to en-
force a U.S. judgment against a U.S. citizen residing in Britain, finding
56. See supra note 5.
57. See 47 AM. JUR. 2D Judgments § 1249 (1962). See also Ritchie v. McMullen, 159
U.S. 235 (1895) (judgment entered by a U.S. court will be enforced in Canada if a Canadian
judgment has been enforced under similar circulmstances in the U.S.). But see Coulbourn v.
Joseph, 195 Ga. 723, 25 S.E.2d 576 (1943) (judgment of a foreign court will be enforced only
if the legal system of the country of judgment is compatible with the legal system of the
U.S.).
58. See infra notes 63-72 and accompanying text.
59. See, eg., Robertson, supra note 21, and Note, supra note 3.
60. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895) (" 'The general comity, utility, and convenience
of nations have ... established a usage among most civilized states, by which the final
judgments of foreign courts of competent jurisdiction are reciprocally cai-ried into execu-
tion,'" quoting Wheat. Int. Law § 147 (8th ed. 1866)).
61. The United States taxes its citizens worldwide. I.R.C. §§ 1, 61 (CCH 1981).
62. See supra note 46.
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such a tax to be irrational, oppressive, or onerous when viewed from
the standpoint of English legal culture. Yet formal reciprocity would
require enforcement, unless the English court could invoke the public
policy exception.
Structural Reflection: A Proposal
Structural reflection, like formal reciprocity, is based on principles of
comity. Unlike formal reciprocity it embodies elements of compatibil-
ity. Additionally, it refines the concept of reciprocity. These two ele-
ments combine to make it an appropriate test for the enforcement of
tax judgments.
A. Compatibility and the "Public Policy Exception"
The most often invoked exception to enforcement of private law
judgments is the public policy exception, based on the underlying re-
quirement of legal compatibility. 63 The requirement of legal compati-
bility is often expressed as follows: the foreign law does (or does not)
offend this State's public policy.64 The declaration of offense to public
policy results from a contextually incongruous placement of foreign
law into the enforcing court's legal culture.65
The public policy exception from comity enforcement and the "pub-
lic policy clause" in treaty enforcement both serve the same function:
to screen out judgments according to their legal compatibility. The
comity principle, however, allows greater discretion to the court than
does treaty enforcement. A treaty is a "law of the land" obligation, to
which the "public policy exception" may be applied only in unusual
circumstances.
66
Finding that a foreign judgment offends the enforcing nation's public
policy may be based on either substantive or procedural grounds. It
must include certain "due process" notions, such as notice, opportunity
63. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
64. Id.
65. See Smit, International Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel in the United States, 9
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 44 (1962) ("The [public policy exception] has afforded escape from recog-
nition in cases ranging from situations in which the foreign judgment did indeed appear to
be incompatible with local notions of fundamental justice and decency, to situations in
which the foreign substantive law applied in the constitution of the foreign judgment was
merely different from that prevailing at the local forum"; id. at 52).
66. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2 ("[A]I1 Treaties made, or which shall be made under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land. .. ."). See TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 167-68 (1978) ("Under the supremacy clause, it is indis-




to be heard, etc.67 A public policy test gives courts the ability to en-
force foreign judgments on a selective basis. The same exception could
be applied to the transnational enforcement of tax judgments.
Public policy tests, as a general solution to the transnational enforce-
ment of tax judgments, have been criticized because of their potential
abuse in application. Proponents of enforcement worry that courts
may misuse the public policy tests by applying subjective or political
concepts of "public policy." 68 Application of the public policy excep-
tion in an ostensibly arbitrary manner might offend foreign nations and
could hamper international relations.
69
The public policy exception is essential to safeguard due process.
Without its protection, an oppressive nation might convert its distaste
for one of its citizens into a "tax obligation," obtain aproforma judg-
ment, and then use transnational enforcement to reach him.70 To pro-
tect against such abuse, some might argue that considerable scrutiny
should be applied to all requests for enforcement, even if the result is
that many judgments go unenforced.
The problem with "public policy" is that the term is seldom precisely
defined and therefore does not provide a manageable standard for judi-
cial decisions. Clearly, the public policy exception should be preserved
to block enforcement against someone who has been denied an oppor-
tunity to be heard.71 It should also be used to block an act of individu-
alized political oppression.72 The concept, however, provides little
guidance when applied to judgments based on taxes, which though
fairly imposed, are foreign to the particular legal culture.
Aggressive invocation of an undefined public policy exception could
make enforcement so infrequent and irregular as to be little improve-
ment over the present absence of enforcement. If a notion of legal
compatibility (at least as to taxes) were accurately defined, the public
67. For a discussion of the effect of due process concerns on the enforcement of foreign
judgments, see Smit, supra note 66, at 46-47 ("[A] due process question might be raised if
either a federal or a state tribunal proposed to give cognizance to, and clothe with domestic
sanctions, a foreign judgment that was obtained in utter disaccord with domestic notions of
fairness.").
68. See supra note 66 (public policy can be applied in cases where there is a mere differ-
ence in substantive law between judgment and enforcing states).
69. But see Leflar, supra note 5, at 217 (arguing that refusal to enforce based on public
policy would be less offensive than general non-enforcement).
70. One can imagine the scenario where a government enacts a "tax" aimed at recover-
ing wealth from certain easily identified individuals. For example, the present Iranian gov-
ernment might impose a "tax" on the wealth accumulated by members of the former
Pahlavi regime.
71. Seesupra note 68.
72. Seesupranote7l.
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policy tests could be used with greater precision. Both the courts and
potential taxpayers would know the meaning of "public policy," and
would adjust their expectations accordingly.
Structural reflection, as described below offers a flexible yet clear
framework for courts to rule on the transnational enforcement of tax
judgments. It replaces the vague generalities of the public policy ex-
ception to offer meaningful criteria for judicial decisions.
B. The Test for Structural Reflection
"Structural reflection" is distinguishable from the formal reciprocity
of automatic enforcement and is based on a systematic matching of the
kind and scope of taxes imposed in two or more legal systems. Under
the principles of structural reflection, for every tax to be enforced in the
enforcing state, there must exist an analogous tax in the judgment state.
Returning to the case where the U.S. seeks to enforce a judgment
against a U.S. citizen residing in Britain, the result would differ from
that obtained by applying formal reciprocity. In this case, there would
be no structural reflection because the U.K. would not tax a U.K. sub-
ject residing in the U.S., as the U.K. does not tax its subjects when they
are resident abroad. What the U.S. seeks and what formal reciprocity
would require is a one-sided obligation on the part of the enforcing
state.
A test for structural reflection will eliminate such instances of one-
sidedness required by formal reciprocity, which would be common-
place given the great variety of taxes. Structural reflection, as a test in
transnational enforcement, has a simple premise: no nation should be
asked to enforce a tax which it would not itself impose. Formal reci-
procity necessarily violates this principle.
The test for structural reflection is a two-step mode of analysis: first,
a comparison between the "kind" of tax imposed by the judgment state
and the taxing scheme of the enforcing state; second, a comparison of
the "scope" of the taxes of the two systems. 73 A four-part classification
of "kinds" of taxes can serve for the first comparison test for structural
reflection. Three kinds of taxes are based on items of wealth. These
are taxes imposed at the time of (1) acquisition (e.g. income taxes),
(2) continued possession (e.g. property taxes), or (3) disposal (death or
gift taxes).74 A fourth kind of tax is based on a privilege, such as im-
73. See infra notes 78-80 and accompanying text.
74. In the United States, the federal government imposes income (I.R.C. § 1) and estate




port, employment, business, or excise taxes. 75 In cases of transnational
enforcement, some taxes are more clearly analogous than others, with
income and estate taxes being the easiest to classify in homologous cat-
egories. Most nations today impose all four kinds of taxes, although
there is great variance as to the relative mix utilized in providing a
revenue base.
76
Once two taxes are found alike in kind, it is appropriate to turn to
the second prong of the test for structural reflection. It requires a com-
parison of the "scope" of taxes imposed by the two nations. Nations
differ greatly as to the scope of power they extend to their taxing au-
thorities. A nation's tax scope may far exceed the boundaries of its
effective power to tax, its unilateral tax "reach."
77
To analyze national tax scopes, it is helpful to isolate the component
tax "theories" on which authority to tax is based. A "theory" of taxa-
tion identifies the feature which subjects the person or wealth to tax.78
A national taxing scheme may be based on one such theory, or, as in
the United States, on an intersecting amalgam of such theories.79
75. For example, federal Social Security taxes are exacted from all employers for the
"privilege" of hiring workers.
76. The United States relies heavily on income taxes to raise revenues. There is no fed-
eral U.S. property tax. In France, however, property taxes are much more important for
providing national revenues.
77. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text. Scope is a different concept from tax
"reach." Given the present rule of international non-enforcement, all nations are effectively
limited to collecting only those taxes within their tax "reach" (be it in personam, in rem or
quasi in rem "reach"). The American notion of scope (or legitimate authority to tax) is
perhaps the broadest in the world. The U.S. seeks to impose certain taxes, such as income
taxes, on a broader class of persons (its own citizens wherever resident) than do most other
nations.
78. The notion of "theory of taxation" has been taken from lectures by Professor Boris I.
Bittker delivered in the fall of 1981 at Yale Law School. Any errors in the analysis
presented here originate with the author.
79. The American system of taxation is defined in scope by the conjunction of three
fundamental theories of taxation, which are the benefit theory, the "ability-to-pay" theory,
and the public duty theory. The benefit theory imposes a tax on those who extract protec-
tion and support from the American government and American institutions. The tax is the
price due for benefits received from the government. For example, a U.S. resident alien is
asked to pay a tax based on his worldwide income in exchange for the benefits and rights he
receives from U.S. residency. I.R.C. §§ 1, 61 (CCH 1981). A non-resident alien who oper-
ates a U.S. trade or business is expected to pay tax on his U.S.-source income, to compensate
for his taking advantage of the U.S. market. I.R.C. §§ 871, 872. A non-resident alien who is
present in the U.S. for more than six months of the year is asked to pay a tax on his capital
gains, premised on the benefits received from such a long transiency. I.R.C. § 871(a)(2).
The second type of tax theory upon which the U.S. taxing scheme is based is the ability-
to-pay theory. Although this theory is similar to the benefit theory, it differs in that the
amount of accessible wealth determines the tax, even if the taxpayer receives little or no
corresponding benefit. For example, a non-resident alien who receives dividends from a
U.S. corporation operating exclusively abroad faces a 30 percent tax on those dividends,
even though he may not receive commensurate benefits from the U.S. government. I.R.C.
§§ 871(a), 881(a) & 1441. The rationale is that the wealth is where the U.S. government can
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While seldom explicitly discussed, tax "theories" are useful analytical
tools for understanding a nation's authority to impose taxes, and can
serve in the comparison of taxes imposed by different nations.
The test for structural reflection requires comparing the taxes im-
posed by two different legal systems. Whereas the two taxes alike in
kind may not exactly correspond in limits, if their scope is based on a
similar tax "theory," the reciprocity of structural reflection is satisfied,
and enforcement can follow.
C. An Example of Structural Reflection
The operation of the test for structural reflection can be seen in an
example analyzed under the U.S. and French tax systems. Both coun-
tries have experienced difficulties in controlling foreign corporations lo-
cated in offshore "tax haven" jurisdictions, where wealth is allowed to
accumulate yet not be subject to tax until and unless it is returned
home to its U.S. or French owner.
The United States pioneered a solution to the problem of offshore
tax deferral by implementing a series of provisions popularly known as
Subpart F.80 Subpart F operates by imposing a tax on the U.S. owner
based on the present income of its "controlled foreign corporation
[CFC]." The tax is imposed whenever certain U.S. ownership 8' and
type of income82 requirements are met. In general, a sole U.S. share-
holder who owns a CFC that receives all of its income from passive
sources (dividends, interest, royalties, etc.) will be subject to tax on the
income that the corporation earns.
8 3
More recently, the French Government amended its tax code to deal
with the problem of foreign corporations and tax deferral.8 4 As does
easily get hold of it, and for that reason it should be taxed. Note that the ability-to-pay
theory by itself suggests a taxing scope co-extensive with unilateral, tax "reach." It would
limit taxing authority to the reach of effective power.
The third tax theory characteristic of the U.S. taxing scheme is the "public duty" theory.
It is the obligation of every U.S. citizen, resident or non-resident, to pay a tax based on
worldwide income (that is, both U.S.-source and foreign income). I.R.C. §§ 1, 61(a).
Clearly, this obligation exceeds the notion of benefits received and requires the submission
to tax of sums which the government could not expect to reach unilaterally, even in cases
where there is no ability-to-pay, such as double taxation.
80. I.R.C. §§ 951-64 (CCH 1981).
81. I.R.C.§951.
82. I.R.C. § 952.
83. See B. BITTKER, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS T 68.3 (1981).
The precise mechanism of Subpart F is quite complicated.
84. Art. 70, Loi no. 80-10 du 18 janvier 1980. (French Finance Act of 1980), Dalloz,
Code G~n~rale des Impbts (Suppl. 1980) (on file with the Yale Journal of World Public Or-
der). For a discussion of art. 70, see Kaplan & Ault, International Developments-.4nother
View, Subpart Fa la Franqaise, 8 J. CORP. TAX. 68, 68-70 (1981).
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the U.S. Subpart F, the French "Article 70" has an ownership require-
ment.85 Unlike Subpart F, however, it only applies to corporate own-
ers,86 and only applies to those foreign subsidiaries located within
certain "privileged" tax systems.87 Therefore, it is not the type of in-
come which the foreign corporation earns but its place of operation
which triggers the French tax. These "privileged" jurisdictions are in-
cluded in a iste noire issued by the French Government. 88
Both the U.S. Subpart F and the French Article 70 are intended to
solve the same problem: to prevent abuse of tax deferral privileges
granted to foreign subsidiaries. They diverge in their technical opera-
tion, however. Assume a U.S. corporation owns a Netherlands subsidi-
ary which holds many of its worldwide patents and receives income
from its patent royalties. Subpart F would impose a tax on this income
to the U.S. parent.8 9 A French parent which holds an analogous
Netherlands subsidiary would not be subject to tax under Article 70
because the Netherlands is not a "tax haven" on the liste noire.90 Simi-
larly, if a French company operates an active Netherlands Antilles sub-
sidiary it would be subject to tax under Article 70 because the
Netherlands Antilles is on the liste noire.9t A U.S. parent that owned an
analogous subsidiary would not be taxed by Subpart F.92 Thus the two
provisions, while intended to solve the same problems, produce differ-
ent outcomes in their practical operation.
The issue posed, therefore, is twofold: first, whether a French court
should enforce a U.S. Subpart F judgment in a situation where Article
70 would not apply; and conversely, whether a U.S. court should en-
force a French Article 70 judgment where Subpart F would be inappli-
cable. In both cases, even with technical divergences, enforcement
should follow. This is because both the kind and scope of the taxes are
similar. Both nations tax the parents of foreign subsidiaries on income
earned by those subsidiaries which otherwise would be deferred. Both
extend jurisdiction into the foreign tax haven. Both are based on a
85. Article 70 reads, "a corporation subject to corporation taxation and holding directly
or indirectly at least 25 percent of the shares of a corporation registered in a foreign country
." Art. 70-I, supra note 85.
86. See Art. 70, supra note 85.
87. Id.
88. A copy of a lisle noire of "privileged" tax jurisdictions, issued by the French govern-
ment on October 9, 1975, is on fie with the Yale Journal of World Public Order.
89. I.R.C. §§ 951-64 (CCH 1981).
90. The Netherlands' absence on the liste noire is due more to its status as an E.E.C.
member than to an estimation of its tax policies.
91. See lisle noire, supra note 89.
92. I.R.C. § 952. Income from the active conduct of business is not Subpart F income.
The Yale Journal of World Public Order
similar tax theory (defeat of abusive tax deferral-an ability-to-pay no-
tion). For purposes of structural reflection, Subpart F and Article 70
are the same tax.
A thorough analysis of kind and scope of taxes, including inquiry
into the underlying tax "theory," should clearly indicate which tax
judgments should be enforced as between two countries. The goal is to
satisfy the demand that no nation be asked to enforce a tax it would not
itself impose.
Summary
The rule that the courts of one nation will not enforce the tax laws of
another, though often criticized, continues to be enforced.93 In the au-
thor's view, the rule continues because of the failure of previous reform
proposals to resolv'--the problem of reciprocity. These proposals have
utilized a formal concept of reciprocity (mutual enforcement) that
would require courts to enforce taxes incongruous with their own legal
cultures.94 A preferable concept of reciprocity is "structural reflection,"
which requires comparison of the structures of tax systems. This re-
quirement is based on the proposition that no nation be asked to en-
force a tax it would not itself impose.95 A nation may decline to impose
a certain kind of tax for policy reasons, or it may not assert the same
scope of taxing authority, based on a more limited tax theory. An anal-
ysis of kind and scope will determine whether structural reflection is
satisfied. If the test for structural reflection is met, enforcement should
be required, unless the traditional public policy exception is applied
because of failure of due process or fair-play. When applying struc-
tural reflection to the tax to be enforced, the traditional public policy
exception will rarely need to be invoked, because analysis of the com-
patibility of a foreign tax with a legal culture is an integral part of the
structural reflection test. The application of the structural reflection
test should replace non-enforcement as the norm in the transnational
tax judgment area.
93. See supra notes 30-41 and accompanying text.
94. See supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
95. See supra notes 64-73 and accompanying text.
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